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INTRODUCTION
On 29 December 1992, the first multi-party elections - both
presidential and parliamentary - since 1966 were held in
Kenya. Exactly five years later this happened again. Not only in
Kenya, but also in the international Community, these elections
were followed with special interest, for several interrelated
reasons: (1) such elections are considered a major aspect of the
'democratization' process which has been imposed by the
western donors on many African states; (2) Kenya has always
been a very Western-oriented, open, capitalist and politically
fairly stable country amidst a group of countries being quite dif-
ferent in these respects; (3) although less than in the past, it
still has strategie importance for the Western countries (for
example, Mombasa was an important harbour during the Gulf
War); and (4) Kenya is a major 'outlet' for substantial Western
donor funds.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the results of the elec-
tions are analysed in terms of ethnicity and various kinds of
manipulation. Second, the importance of election observation
is assessed. The two aims are interrelated: given the usual way
of election observation (that is, only during a very short period
centred around the actual polling day), does observation lead
to less manipulation, that is, to more 'free and fair' elections
than otherwise? One could go even further: given the ethnic de-
termination of the election results in Kenya, does observation
make sense? In the final section of this paper, a cautious answer
to these questions is given.
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The paper was largely written before the elections of 1997;
hence, the main part of it is about the 1992 elections. The 1997
elections are dealt with in the final section, discussing briefly
the changes that occurred during the months preceding the
polls - including important changes as far as election observa-
tion is concerned — as well as the results.
BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1989, the Kenyan population counted about 25 million
people, subdivided into some 40 ethnic groups. None of the
ethnic groups dominates in terms of size. The largest group are
the Kikuyu (21 per cent), mainly living in the central part of
the country. Then come the Luhya (14 per cent) in western
Kenya, the Luo (13 per cent) near Lake Victoria, the Kalenjin
(l l per cent) in the central Rift Valley, the Kamba (l l per cent)
living east and south-east of Nairobi, the Kisii (6 per cent) in
the south-west and the Meru (5 per cent) living east of Mount
Kenya. All these groups consist of several subgroups. For in-
stance, the Luhya are known for their internal rivalries, while
there is also not much of a group feeling among the different
Kikuyu subgroups. However, among the Kalenjin such a group
feeling has become apparent since the end of the 1970s (or has
been created since Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin himself, became
president in 1978). During the colonial period, nobody ever
mentioned this group as an entity but talked of smaller ethnic
groups like the Nandi, the Kipsigis, the Pokot and the Tugen.
After a bloody guerrilla war, known as the Mau Mau, of espe-
cially the Kikuyu in the 1950s against the British colonial ad-
ministration and its African collaborators, Kenya obtained its
independence in 1963. Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, became the
first president. During the period prior to independence two po-
litical movements were formed, the Kenya African National
Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratie Union
(KADU). KANU combined Kikuyu and Luo interests, while
KADU found its political base among some smaller ethnic
groups, mainly in the Rift Valley. KANU stood for rclatively
radical policies, with slogans like 'African socialism' and a pref-
erence for a strong central state. KADU represented more
moderate political ideas and adhered to a decentralized state
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apparatus and more room for private initiative. The first presi-
dent, Kenyatta, originated from KANU, while the incumbent
president, Moi, was one of the leaders of KADU.
Almost immediately after independence, the two parties
melted together into one KANU and most leaders soon moved
towards political middle positions. This resulted, in 1966, in the
secession of a group led by the first vice-president, Jaramogi
Oginga Odinga, a Luo. These dissidents founded the radical
Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). In 1969 this party was forbidden
by the government and its leaders were put in prison. Hence, a
de facto one-party state came into existence. Howevcr, within the
one party, KANU, there were strong differences of opinion as
well as a growing resistance to the concentration of power and
wealth in the hands of a small Kikuyu group around president
Kenyatta.
Kenyatta died in 1978 and was succeeded by Daniel arap
Moi, who had been vice-president for ten years. Since Moi was a
Tugen, a Kalenjin subgroup, this marked a new era in which po-
litical and economie power shifted to the Kalenjin. Of course,
especially during the first years of Moi's presidency, this was a
precarious process, but by skilfully manoeuvring hè succeeded
in gradually strengthening his position. He survived a coup
attempt in 1982 and from then on hè transformed the only per-
mitted political party, KANU, into a state apparatus in his
hands and the coterie surrounding him. Kenya had become a
de jure one-party state.
ETHNICITY AND TERRITORIALITY1
Despite rnore than forty years of 'nation building', sub-
national/ethnic identities are still very strong, and under
President Moi's leadership they have intensified. The 'ethnic
question' became a major item at the elections of 1992, and the
'ethnic cleansing' that started in some areas in 1991 (and again
occurred in 1997) still has the potential to provoke all-out
ethnic warfare and to break the country apart in ethnic zones.
If 'ethnicity' has such a potentially dcvastating power, how
'ethnic' is Kenya? It is interesting to look at the ethno-
demographic trends in Kenya before the 1992 elections. After
defining 'ethnic clusters'2 and 'ethnic home areas'J we have
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looked at the changes in the level of concentration of the
various ethnic clusters in these home areas, comparing the
census years 1969, 1979 and 1989. With one small exception all
ethnic clusters in Kenya became less concentrated in their
home areas, or, to say it the other way around, became more
dispersed. Demographically speaking a considerablc ethnic
deconcentration took place. The pace of deconcentration was
much faster between 1969 and 1979 than during the following
decade, though (with two exceptions). Nevertheless, despite the
general tendency of dispersal, most ethnic clusters are still
rather concentrated in their 'home areas': the Coastal Bantu
and the Meru cluster leading with more than 90 per cent, fol-
lowed by Kisii, Maasai, Somali, Boran, Kamba and Luo with
more than 75 per cent. The Luhya, Kalenjin, Kikuyu and
Turkana are the groups with the highest dispersal outside their
'home areas'.
Wc can also look at the changes in ethnic homogencity at the
level of the districts; for instance, the proportion of the district
population taken up by the major ethnic group. It appears that
most Kenyan districts were less homogeneous in 1989 than in
1969. However, therc is a different overall trend 1969-79 and
1979-89. Compared to 1969, 75 per cent of all districts were
more heterogeneous in 1979. Out of those 30 districts 18
showed the same trend between 1979 and 1989, but 12 showcd
a reversed trend of ethnic homogenization during the 1980s.4 In
addition, seven districts had a trend of ethnic homogenization
during both periods.'' This means that during the 1980s - the
first decade of President Moi's era - almost half of the Kenyan
districts expericnced an ethnic homogenization trend, with ex-
amples from almost all ethnic groups. Looking at it in a longcr
time perspcctivc, the ethnic cleansing during the beginning of
the 1990s can thus be seen as the violent continuation of a
process that started at least a decade earlier.
'DEMOCRATIZATION'
From 1990 onwards, there was so much pressure for democrati-
zation from both internal and external forces that Moi had to
give in. However, hè continuously stressed that multi-partyism
would lead to ethnic struggles. And indeed, it is well known that
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a group of political leaders around him did everything to make
this a self-fulfilling prophecy. From the start of the political
campaigns, ethnic violence took place, first between Kalenjin
and Luhya, thereafter extended to bloody 'tribal clashes'
between Kalenjin and Luo, between Kalenjin and Kikuyu, and
between Maasai and Kikuyu, while the endemic violence in the
northern pastoralist areas developed into a chaos of robberies
and looting.
In the beginning of the political campaign for the elections of
December 1992 it looked as if the political Opposition was
heading for an easy victory, since the political dominance of
Moi's KANU was limited to the Rift Valley. However, in the
course of 1992, the Opposition, led by veteran politicians who
were each others rivals, feil apart into two main groupings: the
Democratie Party (DP) of the former vice-president Mwai
Kibaki (a Kikuyu) and the Forum for the Restoration of
Democracy (FORD) headed by Oginga Odinga (Luo) and by
Kenneth Matiba (Kikuyu), a former minister. A few months
before the elections, FORD feil apart into a group led by
Matiba (FORD-Asili) and a group led by Oginga Odinga
(FORD-Kenya).
A united Opposition would easily have won the presidential
elections of 29 December 1992. Instead, with only 36 per cent of
the votes, Moi was re-elected. And because of the constituency
voting system after British design, KANU won an absolute ma-
jority in parliament: 100 of the 188 seats, against 31 for FORD-
Asili, 31 for FORD-Kenya, 23 for the DP and 3 for smaller
parties.
ETHNIC VOTING
Kenya's political system is characterized by ethnic voting. One
can speak of 'political ethnicity' when several ethnic groups
dcvelop political activities bascd on their claims to ethnic con-
sciousness (ethnicity in this context refers to a 'we-feeling', an
identity based on references to certain perceived (or alleged)
common characteristics, which usually include a common lan-
guage and a common territory but not necessarily so). Closely
rclated to political ethnicity is political clientelism. The politi-
cal leader has to assure himself of as many political 'clients' as
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possible in order to safeguard his position. He finds these
clients primarily among his own ethnic group. In case of compe-
tition between political leaders of one and the same ethnic
group, ethnic groups may vote divided, mostly along clan lines.
The result is that political parties in Kenya (and in many other
African countries as well) are not based on a political pro-
gramme but on ethnicity, in which ethnic self-interest prevails.
How ethnic were the Kenyan elections of 1992? When looking
at the results of the presidential elections at the provincial
level, Map 6.1 shows that Moi obtained a majority not only in
his 'own' Rift Valley Province, but also in Coast and North-
eastern Provinces. The DP candidate, Mwai Kibaki, was strong
in one province only (Eastern). The third candidate, Kenneth
Matiba (FORD-Asili), had his 'clients' first of all in Central
Province and in Nairobi, while Oginga Odinga dominated in
Nyanza Province. Only in Western Province was voting strongly
divided, mainly between Moi and Matiba, reflecting the two
main factions within the Luhya group.
At the district level, ethnic voting was even more conspicu-
ous, which could be expected, since most districts were ethni-
cally defined. For instance, in those districts in Rift Valley
Province with a Kikuyu or Luhya majority, Moi lost. In the dis-
tricts of Eastern Province with groups most related to the
Kikuyu, Moi also did not achieve a majority of the votes.
Equally revealing is the fact that Oginga Odinga found no
support in Kisii, a district in Nyanza Province which is not in-
habited by Luo but by Gusii. Finally, the sharing of the votes
among the four presidential candidates in the two main urban
centres, Nairobi and Mombasa, reflects the ethnic heterogene-
ity in these areas.
The results of the general election showed a similar pattern.
Besides the Kalenjin votes, President Moi's KANU obtained its
support among the pastoralist groups (Turkana, Maasai,
Somali, Samburu, Boran), among the coastal Mijikenda, as well
as among part of the Luhya group in Western Province. These
were also the regions where KADU won in the early sixties. The
Democratie Party won in the northern Kikuyu districts, in the
nearby Meru and Embu areas, and in some Kamba constituen-
cies. FORD-Asili obtained a majority in the southern Kikuyu
districts and in Kakamega where Matiba, the FORD-Asili
leader, had formed an alliance with a populär Luhya politician.
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Map 6.1 Kenyan presidential elections 1992: results by province
(% of votes for the four main candidates)
Dan-el arap Mai (KANUI
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Most of the Nairobi seats went to FORD-Asili, too. Finally,
FORD-Kenya, the party of Luo leader Oginga Odinga, won in
the whole Luo region. Elsewhere in Kenya, FORD-Kenya won
only a few seats, such as in Mombasa where the party had
accepted a number of candidates from the Islamic Party of
Kenya which had been excluded from the election.
Looking at the ethnic background of the elected Opposition
members of parliament, we see that 67 per cent of the FORD-
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Asili members were Kikuyu, 61 per cent of FORD-Kenya Luo
and 52 per cent of the Democratie Party again Kikuyu. In
KANU, however, not a single Luo or Kikuyu won a seat. Among
the KANU members of parliament, we find all Kalenjin repre-
sentatives, 12 out of 17 elected Kamba from the south-east, 9
out of 10 elected Somali from the north-east, all 6 elected
Maasai, 6 out of 9 elected Gusii, as well as representatives from
all the smaller ethnic groups. The numerically second group in
Kenya, the Luhya, was strongly divided: 9 representatives for
FORD-Asili, 7 for KANU and 5 for FORD-Kenya. Despite this,
the influential Kenyan weekly The Weekly Review wrote: 'The
seventh parliament will be a living example of the reality of
ethnic politics in Kenya.' Even in the multicultural capital
Nairobi ethnic voting seemed to have been dominant. The per-
centages of votes for FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya reflected
the percentages of the population being Kikuyu and Luo,
respectively.
LEGAL MANIPULATION
In retrospect, President Moi and his party had an easy victory in
the 1992 elections. A few months before the day the elections
were held (29 December), their prospects were not so bright,
however. The Opposition was still fairly united: that is, the
Democratie Party and FORD. Especially the latter party, com-
bining about half the Kikuyu and the whole Luo communities,
as well as a then still unknown part of the Luhya Community (in
short: based on the support from the three largest ethnic
groups), formed a formidable threat for both the president and
KANU. Indeed, a candidate of any combination of the three
main Opposition parties would have won more votes than Moi.
However, even in case of a united Opposition, becoming the new
president was another thing.
In August 1992, the Gonstitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill
passed the Kenyan parliament. Among other things, this bill
made it mandatory for a successful presidential candidate to
muster at least 25 per cent of the votes in at least five (out of
eight) provinces (besides the requirements of having the great-
est number of votes and being elected a member of parliament
for a constituency). In case none of the candidates would
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achieve this, a run-off should have to be held between the two
leading candidates. What the bill did not specify were various
other possibilities. What had to be done if the leading candi-
date did not meet this requirement but the second one did?
And what had to happen if after the run-off elections, the two
candidates still did not muster the 25 per cent clause? At the
time of the passing of the bill, these possibilities were not
merely theoretical. Nevertheless, the bill sailed smoothly
through parliament without any amendments and with only one
vote against. This was less surprising than it may seern.
Parliament was made up of members of only one party, KANU,
and it was widcly bclieved that if there was a party and a presi-
dential candidate capable of meeting this requirement, it was
KANU and Moi. Perhaps more surprising was the silence from
the Opposition. An explanation might be the one given by the
attorney-general, Amos Wako, asking: 'Are [the Opposition] ad-
mitting that the current president can fulfil that 25 per cent re-
quirement and that any other presidential candidate cannot?'
(The Weekly Review, 14 Aug. 1992: 15).
If this requirement can be regarded as a strong, legal move
towards the re-election of president Moi, another article in the
same bill had to safeguard KANU's governing power. The bill
also mandated the candidate who was elected president to form
a government from among the members of his own political
party, even if that party would not have the parliamentary ma-
jority. In other words, as long as Moi would be re-elected,
KANU would always rctain (complete) power. The clause also
prevented the other parties from forming a coalition govern-
ment in case one of the Opposition candidates might win the
presidential elections. It is remarkable that this clause passed
even more unnoticed than the 25 per cent requirement.
Perhaps it is an indication that in the end all candidates and
parties aim for the same: absolute majority, meaning unshared
power.
What was more controversial, however, was the Electoral
Commission, which had responsibility for the organization and
conduct of the elections. According to the Kenyan constitution,
the Commission is appointed by the president. In order to be
acceptablc to all parties, it was evident that at least its chair-
man, Justice Zacchaeus Chesoni, would have to be considered
by everybody as being impartial. The Opposition leaders were
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never consulted, however, and Chesoni was widely regarded as a
puppet of president Moi. This was serious, since the Electoral
Commission's powers were far-reaching. lts functions included
not only the preparation and supervision of the elections, the
maintenance and revision of voters' registers, and the promo-
tion of voters' education, but also the determination of the
number and boundaries of constituencies based on the most
recent census: the one of 1989 (Kenya 1992a). It is the latter re-
sponsibility which may have decisively influenced the outcome
of the parliamentary election in KANU's favour.
There are two ways in which manipulation is possible by
means of defining constituencies. The first one is known as 'ger-
rymandering': the boundary of a constituency is drawn in such a
way that the group one does not want to win forms a minority.6
Even though there were allegations of'Moimandering' (Finance,
15 Nov. 1994), it is doubtful whether this actually happened
because of the ethnic homogeneity of nearly all districts, and
hence constituencies, at least outside the main urban centres.
That cannot be said of the second manipulation method,
namely the determination of the number of constituencies, or
more specifically the degree of representation per district.
According to the Constitution of Kenya, chapter III, section
42(3), 'all constituencies shall contain as nearly equal numbers
of inhabitants as appears to the Commission to be reasonably
practicable.' In 1966, 158 constituencies were created and in
1987 another 30 were added. Although at the time of the ex-
pansion of the number of seats, KANU was still the only politi-
cal party, it is conspicuous that it created a surplus of small
constituencies (in terms of population) in areas with strong
support for the ruling party.
On average, there should have been about 42,000 voters
per constituency (7.9 million registered voters divided by
188 parliamentary seats). Reality was very different, however.
North-eastern Province (141,000 voters), a KANU stronghold,
allocated 10 constituencies (on average 14,100 voters per seat),
while Nairobi (674,000 voters), an Opposition stronghold,
counted only 8 seats (more than 84,000 voters per con-
stituency). A district like Taita Taveta (66,900 voters), another
KANU stronghold, had four constituencies, while Kisumu Town
(100,000 voters), a FORD-Kenya stronghold, was just a single
constituency. There are many more examples, all pointing in
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the same direction: arcas where KANU was known to be strong
(Rift Valley, Coast Province and the sparsely populated areas in
the north) are quite over-represented in the Kenyan parlia-
ment. This explains why KANU, with only 34 per cent of the
votes in the parliamentary election, was able to win 53 per cent
of the seats. Seats won by KANU required on average about
33,000 registered voters as against 52,000 for the Opposition. If
constituencies had been defined on a more equal basis, the
balance in parliament between KANU on the one hand, and the
joint Opposition on the other, would have been reversed,
meaning the Opposition would have had a majority of seats.
There is another method of legal manipulation, which may
not have such a direct impact as the previous one, but which
can influence the outcome in an indirect way. This concerns
control by the different political parties of the mass media and
particularly television. There are two national television compa-
nies in Kenya. The oldest one is the Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation (KBC), which is state owned. The other one is the
Kenyan Television Network (KTN), which is owned by KANU.
In other words, television is avowedly pro-government. That
cannot be said of the press, however. The biggest newspaper,
The Daily Nation, is independent, the second largest, The
Standard, takes a 'central' position, while the third one, The
Kenya Times, is owned by KANU. Moreover, among the weeklies
and monthlies there are some highly critical Journals, which are
widely read.
Finally, legal manipulation can also take place by announc-
ing populär policy measures shortly before election day. This
was the case at the annual Jamhuri Day, two weeks before the
election of 29 December 1992. Minimum wages for all workers
went up by 12 per cent, married women in the civil service were
awarded house allowance (a very sensitive point in Kenya),
travelling allowances for Muslims going to Mecca were more
than doubled, and over 4,500 prisoners serving sentences of up
to six months were releascd. That same Jamhuri Day, which is
supposed to be a national celebration, turned into an outright
KANU rally (covercd by television, of course), prompting
several foreign diplomats (among whom the ambassadors of the
United States, Germany and Sweden) to demonstratively leave
the Nairobi stadium whcrc it was held.
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As said, the above-mentioned ways of legal manipulation did
not receive very much attention from the press, the Opposition
and others. More criticisms could be heard regarding various
types of illegal manipulation. This concerns not only all kinds of
irregularities on election day itself (see below), but also events
during the preparation stages in the months prior to the actual
elections to which we will turn now.
Gomplaints started as soon as the registration of voters
starled on 8 June 1992. According to the Opposition, malprac-
tice was widespread and the Electoral Commission dis-
organizcd; hence, they called for a boycott. When nothing
happened, the Opposition decided to make the best of a bad job,
and registration went on for 43 days (in 1988 it took three
months!). The final deadline came amidst widespread com-
plaints, especially in Nairobi, from people who said they had not
been able to obtain identity cards, which are a prerequisite to
registration. The relatively short period of voter registration
may have been the cause for the low number of voters that were
registered in the end: 7.9 million. Compared with an adult
population of about 11 million, one can only conclude that at
least a few million potential voters were not registered.
The essential questions, then, are: where did most of these
unregistered voters live? Or: to which ethnic groups did they
belong? Or: did KANU benefit from the non-registration of so
many potential voters? According to Africa Conßdential (of
18 Dec. 1992), the latter question should be answered with a
'yes'. At district level, this cannot be confirmed, however.
Compared with the total populations in all districts, votcrs'
registration ranged from a low 25 per cent in Kwale District to
a 'high' 56 per cent in Mombasa District. But one cannot find
evidence that registration in 'KANU districts' was higher than
in 'Opposition districts'.
As for the nomination of candidates for the parliamentary
election, the story was different, however. There were reported
incidents of violence, abductions and obstructions directed
mainly at Opposition candidates during the parliamentary and
civic nominations in December. A number of Opposition
candidates were physically prevented from presenting their
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nomination papers in their constituencies, particularly in Rift
Valley Province, which many KANU activists had declared a
'KANU zone'. The Opposition leaders demanded from the
Electoral Commission a repeat of the nominations in all areas
where the Opposition had cried foul. Strong protests also came
from the Commonwealth observation team, as well as from
several diplomatic missions. The only thing Chesoni was pre-
pared to do was set up a five-man commission, composed of
members of the Electoral Commission, with the task of investi-
gating the reported irregularities. The final result was, first,
that the cases where candidates had been physically obstructed
from presenting their nomination papers feil outside the au-
thority of the Commission and had to be referred to the High
Court and, second, that in the 16 constituencies where Opposi-
tion candidates had not presented their papers, the
Commission had decided that the KANU candidates would
stand unopposed, thus giving KANU a comfortable head start.
Several other irregularities and malpractices wcre reported,
mostly shortly before and on election day. Some of these were
directly attributable to the Electoral Commission. For instance,
a numbcr of polling stations opened with a considerable delay —
in some cases as late as the afternoon - due to the late arrival
of election materials, rnainly ballot boxes, ballot papers and
stamps. There were also cases where the names of some party
candidates were omitted from the ballot papers, but neverthe-
less voting went ahead in the constituencies concerncd. In some
places ballot papers destined for one constituency ended up in a
different constituency. In over 40 constituencies, the number of
presidential and parliamentary ballots failed to match by more
than 800 papers (equivalent to a ballot box füll of papers),
which is regarded as a characteristic sign of ballot box stuffing.
Finally, vote counting and release of results were also seriously
delayed. In all, a representative of one of the major observer
teams, the Washington-based International Republican
Institute, was openly wondering whether the whole process was
'systematic or indicative of a focused effort to disadvantage
specific regions, constituencies or candidates' (The Weekly
Review, l Jan. 1993:48).
There were also irregularities which feil outside the respons-
ibilities of the Electoral Commission. Among these were harass-
ment and intimidation of voters - particularly by the Youth of
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KANU '92 (YK '92) - and vote buying. The latter took place on
a large scale, predominantly by YK '92 and the other KANU
support groups Operation Moi Wins and Toroitich Till 2000
(Toroitich is Moi's middle name). Unlike the Opposition parties,
KANU disposed of large sums of money (state money, according
to many), and was, for instance, able to set up national and
provincial secretariats for its support groups with full-time
staff. An estimated US$60 million was spent on vote buying,
mostly by KANU supporters. Expenses ranged from hiring
transport for voters and bodyguards for candidates, to employ-
ing thugs and distributing party T-shirts or even cash money to
passers-by.
OBSERVATION
Not only in Kenya itself, but also from the perspective of the
donor-countries, the 1992 elections were seen as a major event
in the process of democratization. After all, Moi had to agree
with multi-partyism and elections after maximum external
pressure, notably by suspending foreign aid. Hence, in order to
restore the fmancial relations between Kenya and its donors,
the elections had to be labelled 'free and fair'. This explains the
great interest in the elections from outside Kenya.
There were several international observation teams. Besides
the above-mentioned International Republican Institute (IRI)
team, there were officials of two other institutions from the
United States, namely the Federal Electoral Commission and
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (a third
American-based group, the National Democratie Institute, had
been rejectcd by President Moi because of its supposed bias in
favour of the Opposition). Another important group was the
Commonwealth team, led by Sir Tclford Georges, a former chief
justice in Zimbabwe and Tanzania. The Commonwealth team
was the largest ever sent out by the body on such an assignment,
which was in Kenya considered an indication of the seriousness
with which the conduct of the elections was being regarded in
the Western world. There were also national teams from
Canada/Sweden (the so-called Scancan team), Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In
all, more than 150 external observers watchcd the elections.
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The most important local observation team was the National
Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), consisting of several profes-
sional and church-related organizations in Kenya. Funded by
external donors and chaired by Rev. Samwel Kobia (Sccretary-
general of the National Council of Churches of Kenya), NEMU
was set up to coordinate local bodies planning to monitor the
forthcoming elections and to educate the public on matters re-
lating to the holding of free and fair polls. Among the 20
members of its 'council of elders' were a former governor of the
Central Bank of Kenya, two former permanent secretaries and
a leading bankcr, which were intended to give NEMU much-
needed credibility. Other local monitoring groups were the
Bureau for Education, Research and Monitoring, the National
Council of Women of Kenya and the National Committee for
the Status of Women in Kenya.
At this point it is important to distinguish between observa-
tion and monitoring. Usually the distinction is made by the
length of the period during which the election process is being
watched. Observation, then, is restricted to the actual election
day(s) and (part of) the counting of the votes during the day(s)
afterwards. Monitoring covers a much longer period and in-
cludes the months prior to the actual election day(s). All inter-
national teams were observation teams (although the IRI
organized two missions to Kenya in order to get at least an im-
prcssion of the nomination process and the campaigns), while
the local teams were more of the monitoring type. Interestingly,
the Electoral Commission of Kenya used the official status of
the person involved as the distinctive criterion, an observer
simply being 'a spectator' but a monitor 'almost [being] an
official participant within the polling station at which he/she
must exclusively operate' (Kenya 1992b: 1). According to the
Commission, observcrs should in particular scrutinize the fol-
lowing aspects of the actual elections (Kenya 1992b: 2—3):
• maintenance of peaceful and orderly voting process;
• documcntation and recording of accountable equipment and
papers;
• display of empty boxes beforc voting;
• scaling before and after polling;
• transportation of ballot boxes from the polling stations to
the counting centres;
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checking of the seals to the aperture and elsewhere before
opening of ballot boxes;
noting the sealed packets of accountable stationery from the
polling stations and the presiding officers' statement of
ballot papers issued;
the manner in which votes are counted;
collating and correlating of results; and
visible indication that the presiding officer is in control of
the entire polling Situation.
onOn the day the Commonwealth team arrived in Kenya
16 December, two weeks before the election day- the IRI just
released a press statement of findings on the campaign and
nomination process. The report was based on a two-week
observation mission and was fairly negative, stating for in-
stance that the electoral process had been 'severely damaged
by the centralized and systematic manipulation of the admin-
istrative and security structure of the state to the ruling
party's advantage' (The Weekly Review, 18 Dec. 1992: 14). The
statement also spoke of 'political harassment' of Opposition
candidates and 'illegal' use of KANU money to influence
voters. There was a furious reaction from the YK '92 chair-
man, Cyrus Jirongo, heatedly accusing the IRI of siding with
the Opposition, asking the Electoral Commission to cancel the
accreditation of the US team and deport them, and if not,
threatening to bar the IRI observers from visiting polling
stations on polling day (a threat which could not be seen as
entirely imaginative).
At the same media briefing, the spokesperson of the IRI
team, Margaret Thompson, also stressed that the observer
teams were in Kenya to observe and report, not to monitor the
polls. As she explained, monitoring would mean virtually over-
seeing the whole election process (at least a period of six
months), whilc observing involved mainly placing personnel at
selected stations in order to gct an impression of whether or
not the polls were frec and fair. But even within this limited
scope, this was precisely one of the major weaknesses of the ob-
servation process, bccause therc were far too few international
observers. The result was that only a minority of all polling sta-
tions could bc visited by the observation teams, and the time
spent at each station was usually very short, certainly not the
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whole day. This can be excmplified by the following account
(Geisler 1993:620):
In Kenya, covering an area more than twice the size of
Britain, 160 international observers were confronted with
over 7,000 polling stations (roughly 45 for each of them), not
to mention the 10,500 or so 'streams' with their separate
voting procedures. The 56 members of the International
Republican Institute managed to visit 2.3 per cent of the
polling stations in a quarter of all constituencies, while the
33-strong Commonwealth Observer Group claimed to have
seen roughly three per cent of all polling stations in 75 per
cent of the 188 constituencies. The coverage of other observa-
tion missions was altogether more patchy. A Swedish team of
four, for example, visited 22 stations in two constituencies,
and others did not fare much better.
The observation team from the Netherlands consisted of
seven representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
The Hague. The large majority of them had had experience
with or in Kenya before, which was feit as 'very useful'.7
According to the terms of reference, the mission's observations
only concerned the election day itself and, to a limited extent,
also the counting of the votes. More specifically, the aspects
which were to be watched in particular were the opening of the
polling station (including the sealing of the ballot boxes), the
closing of the ballot boxes, the transportation of the ballot
boxes to the central counting station, as well as the start of the
counting of the votes.
Together with a represcntative from the Netherlands
Embassy in Nairobi, each team member 'covered' a specific
area in Kenya. These were parts of the following districts:
Nairobi, Embu/Meru, Laikipia, Kajiado, Uasin Gishu/Elgeyo
Marakwet, West Pokot, and Turkana (the former three being
Opposition strongholds and the latter four being KANU strong-
holds). In all, the sevcn teams visited 68 polling stations and
9 counting offices. Most stations opened too late, some even in
the afternoon, the main reason being late arrival of ballot boxes
and papers due to transport problems. In several stations, there
was a shortage of ink and stamps, in a few also of ballot papers.
The lack of privacy was conspicuous in the eyes of the Western
observers: the voting booths were hardly screened, while the il-
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literates (of which there are many, especially in the rural areas)
had to be aided by the officials. Nevertheless, the observers' im-
pression was that the voters seemed not to have any problem
with this lack of privacy while casting one's vote. In all polling
stations, NEMU observers were present, although many of
them were very young and rcmained quite 'invisible' during the
election day. Also present in most stations were 'agents' of the
four major political parties. In a few cases, it was witnessed that
these agents played a rather intimidating role towards the illit-
crate voters. Finally, in one of the districts, people from a
nearby refugee camp (victims of the 'ethnic clashes' during the
campaigns) were not given the opportunity to vote, despite
their strong wish to do so.
The counting of the votes took place with an enormous delay,
for several reasons. First, many polling stations closed later
because their opening was delayed. Second, some presiding
officers did not give permission to start counting beforc all
ballot boxes had arrived, which because of the transport prob-
lems took many hours. Third, the whole counting process was
very inefficiënt, partly because of the exaggerating attempts to
let it look 'transparent'. In addition, it was observed that no
specific identification had been attached to the ballot boxes
brought in, although this was legally prescribed. It was also
noted that party agents did not check the numbers on the ballot
boxes, even though they had written these down in the
morning. This check would have been the only proof that the
boxes had not been opened between times.
Despite all these imperfections, the judgement of all seven
sub-teams was moderately positive. The general 'impression'
was that, despite the fact that many voters had to queue for
hours in the hot sun, the people had been able to cast their
votes in the way they intended to. There were hardly any irreg-
ularities noticed. It was also feit that voters and officials, as well
as party agents, were very positive regarding the presence of
the international observers.
Of major concern for the Kenyan government were the final
statements by the international observation teams. In private,
none of the international monitoring teams and virtually no
Nairobi-based diplomats could state that the elections had been
fair. In its official statement released on the eve of its depar-
ture (when, according to Geisler 1993, the counting of the votes
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had not yet been concluded in many constituencies!), the
Commonwealth team even admitted this:
This was an clcction that proved difficult to evaluate in terms
of frceness and fairness. It was evident to us from the start
that some aspects of the election were not fair. These
included:
• the registration process in many parts of the country;
• the nomination process, particularly in the Rift Valley, re-
sulting in the unopposed return of 16 KANU parliamen-
tary candidates;
• the lack of transparency on the part of the Electoral
Commission;
• the intimidation, administrative obstacles and violence
that marked the political campaign;
• the partisanship of the state-owned radio and television;
• the reluctance of the government to delink itself from the
KANU party.
These negative aspects were compounded by the numerous
administrative problems that can be directly attributed to
the inability of the Electoral Commission to plan ahead and
pay adequate attention to the many basic and essential ele-
ments of the electoral process. This resulted in late delivery
of materials, polls with too many voters, lack of adequate
training officials and a non-effective public education pro-
gramme. (The Weekly Review, l Jan. 1993: 9)
The statement went on in a more positive tone by stressing the
inexperience of the Electoral Commission, the dedication and
enthusiasm with which the millions of people had exercised
their right to vote, the commitment of the thousands of polling
officials, and so on. lts main conclusion was that the elections
constituted 'a giant step on the road to multi-party democracy'.
The latter was underscored in the official statements of all
other international observation teams, including the one from
the Netherlands. However, some additional remarks in the
report of one of the seven Dutch sub-teams may be revealing.
From reliable sources in the district concerned it became clear
that strong manipulation practices had occurred during the
period before the elections, with the sole aim to limit the anti-
Moi and anti-KANU votes in the district. Examples were high
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payments to potential Opposition candidates who were willing
to withdraw, harassment of (potential) candidates, and Opposi-
tion offices pelted with stones.
The national monitoring teams had between 7,500 and
10,000 observers deployed in the field, and their judgement of
the actual elections was much more critical than that of the in-
ternational teams. Almost immediately after the election day,
the largest, the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU),
declared that the 'electoral process has been seriously com-
promised' and in its final report the unit concluded 'that
the December 1992 elections were not free and fair' (Geisler
1993:627).
THE 1997 ELECTIONS8
Exactly five years after the 1992 elections, the next elections
were held. Before presenting the rcsults, it is important to
(briefly) discuss the developments prior to polling day. These
can best be dealt with in terms of changes on the one hand and
continuities on the other. The continuities refer to renewed
ethnic clashes and to a divided Opposition. The changes concern
the political reforms of September 1997 and the monitoring
activities by the donor Community.
In August and September 1997, very serious ethnic conflicts
emerged at the Coast and later in the south-west as well. The
resemblance with the clashes that occurred in Rift Valley
Province in 1992 was conspicuous. First, the attacks were
carried out by large, well-organized groups. Second, the violence
involved was very brutal, and hundreds of people were killed.
Third, the violence at the Coast was solely directcd at people
from up-country: people known to vote for the Opposition in an
area dominated by KANU. Finally, the cases were never solved:
it never became clear who the real leaders were, let alone that
any of the perpetrators were tried in a court of law.
The Opposition was even more divided than during the 1992
elections. There were 14 Opposition candidates for the presi-
dency, while 24 parties took part in the gencral elections. The
two FORD parties feil further apart. FORD-Kenya - in 1992 a
coalition of the Luo and part of the Luhya communities - split
into two because the Luo political leader, Raila Odinga (son of
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the late Oginga Odinga) stepped out to form his own Luo party,
the National Development Party (NDP). Hence, FORD-Kenya
became a Luhya party led by Kijana Wamalwa. The same hap-
pened with FORD-Asili, which combined part of the Kikuyu and
part of the Luhya communities. Partly because its leader,
Kenneth Matiba, refused to stand for the presidential elections,
the party split into a Luhya faction (FORD-Asili) and a Kikuyu
faction (FORD-People). Several other parties took part in the
elections, two of which were of some importance, notably the
Kamba-based Social Democratie Party (SDP, with the first
female presidential candidate Charity Ngilu) and Safina, the
only party which pretends to have a non-ethnic base (hence its
name, which means 'the Ark'). The largest ethnic group in
Kenya, the Kikuyu, was also the most divided onc, since there
were five Kikuyu candidates for the presidency, although only
one of them, Mwai Kibaki (Democratie Party), was a serious one.
An important change compared with the previous elections
concerned the constitutional and legal reforms of September
1997. For years KANU had refused to comply with the widely-
voiced desire - under the leadership of the NCEC, the National
Convention Executive Council, representing a broad range of
church-related and other societal organizations - for political
reforms in the country. Howcver, in order to avert complete
chaos, a group of about 75 members of parliament from both
KANU and the Opposition parties decided to take the initiative
by forming the so-called Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
(IPPG), which had to formulate a wide range of constitutional
and legal reforms. Among the more important reforms were
the extension of the Electoral Commission by 10 members sug-
gested by Opposition parties (but still forming a minority
against the 11 members from KANU), the provision for a coali-
tion government (in practice meaning that the president can
appoint ministers in his cabinet from Opposition parties, which
is precisely the way Moi became a minister in 1964), the recom-
mendation to register all parties (which led to the registration
of Safina but not of the Coast-based Islamic Party of Kenya),
and the equal allocation of broadcasting time for all parties on
television and radio. However, two issues of decisive importance
for the election results and for the power distribution in the
country were left untouched. This was the 25 per cent rule for
the presidential elections and the determination of the con-
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stitucncy boundaries (by the Electoral Commission); hence the
general conclusion of the NCEC that the reforms 'are massively
deficiënt in ensuring a representative parliament for Kenyans'
and that it is 'not possible to achieve free and fair elections
under these conditions' (The Sundqy Nation, 14 Sept. 1997).
Another important change was in the field of monitoring and
observation of the electoral process. Initiated and coordinated
by the Dutch embassy in Nairobi and chaired by the Ganadian
embassy, a group of 22 donor-countries (also including the
United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the
Scandinavian countries) formed the Donors' Democratie
Development Group (DDDG) in order to monitor the whole
election process, including such critical phases as voter regis-
tration, party primaries, nomination of candidates, political
campaigning, the polling itself and counting (see Rutten
below). The reason to do so was the conviction that manipula-
tion did take place in 1992, perhaps not so much during the
actual elections but during the preceding stages. The actual
monitoring was carried out by a group of researchers from
various donor countries (the Election Observation Centre or
EOC), as well as by teams from the diplomatic missions. Voter
registration, party primaries and nominations of candidates
were followcd in 25 districts. Presidential and parliamentary
campaign meetings were attended in all provinces except one
(North-eastern). On election day, 90 teams visited over 500
polling stations in 118 (of the 210) constituencies and counting
was monitored in 50 counting halls (DDDG 1998).
At the national level, the 1997 elections were observed by a
group, funded by several European countries, whose motto was
'Together for Peaceful Elections' and consisting of the National
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Institute for
Education in Democracy (IED) and the Catholic Justice and
Peace Commission (CJPC). Just like the donor Community, not
only the poll itself was observed - by over 28,000 watchers,
working in teams of two in all the 210 electoral constituencies
and of three present at the counting centres - but also the voter
registration, the nomination process, the campaigns and
the role of the media, by 840 monitors (The Weekly Review,
9Jan. 1998).
Because of the splintered Opposition, largely along 'tribal'
lines, the results of the 1997 election were very much like those
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of the prcvious polls. In the presidential election, Moi won most
votes (40 per cent) and was again the only candidate with more
than 25 per cent of the votes in five of the eight provinces. The
only serious rival was Kibaki, who got 30 per cent of the votes,
with more than 25 per cent in three provinces. The three other
candidates who prior to the polls were also seen as rivals -
Odinga, Wamalwa and Ngilu - were far behind and only
managed to get a substantial number of votes in their 'home'
provinces. In the general elections, KANU again won the ma-
jority of the seats, notably 107 out of 210 (against 100 out of
188 in 1992), of which 11 unopposed. Kibaki's Democratie Party
won 39 seats (23 in 1992), Odinga's National Development
Party 21 and Wamalwa's FORD-Kenya 17 (against 31 in 1992
for the two combined), while newcomers Social Democratie
Party and Safina won 15 and 5 seats, respectively.9 The ethnic
factor in both the presidential and the parliamcntary elections
is clear again: Kibaki and his DP profited from the withdrawal
of Matiba, thus obtaining many votes from that part of the
Kikuyu-Embu-Meru cluster that voted for Matiba and his
FORD-Asili in 1992. Both the NDP and FORD-Kenya are much
smaller now than the original FORD-Kenya in 1992, because of
the split of the latter in a Luo and a Luhya party, respectively.
The election itself was described as 'chaotic'. According to
The Daily Nation of 30 December 1997, 'just about anything that
could go wrong did go wrong'.10 The newspaper talked about a
'Ghaplinesque performance', a 'national disgrace' and 'an insult
to voters', but admitted that not only the Electoral Commission
was to blame for this, but certainly also the extremely bad
weather. In a first analysis of the 'Together for Peaceful
Elections' group, it was stated that 56 per cent of the polling
stations failed to open on time, because voting matcrials were
not available or election officials were not present. The poll
watchers reported concerns about the lack of secrecy in about 6
per cent of the stations. Also during the nomination process
and the political campaigns, many irregularities had been ob-
served, mostly bribery and vote buying, particularly by 'the
ruling party'. On the other hand, the voting itself was reported
to have taken place in 'a serious and largely satisfactory
manner'. The same applied to the counting process. The
group's general conclusion was that despite the many irregu-
larities and the chaotic character of the elections, 'the results
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reflected the wishes of the voters'. At the same time, however, it
was recommended that the institutional bias for KANU, such as
the domination of the state media and the unfair delineation of
electoral constituencies, ought to be seriously addressed (The
Weekly Review, 9Jan. 1998). Much more critical were the NCEC,
the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRG) and the
Citizens Coalition for Gonstitutional Ghange (or '4Gs'). They
rejected the results as null and void, demanding new elections
(The Economie Review, 5 Jan. 1998).
In its final report, the DDDG (1998) also mentioned irregu-
larities during the various stages of the election process. About
four million potential voters were not registered as such: two
million aged 18-23 who had not been issued identity cards and
another two million who just failed to do so. However, as in
1992, there was no proof that non-registration occurred more in
Opposition than in KANU areas. The party primaries were
'peaceful and transparent' in most areas, although problems
were evident in several others. On the whole, the primaries
were 'flawed but acceptable'. The nominations of parliamentary
candidates on 8 and 9 December went 'satisfactorily', although
in a number of areas there was violence and tension. As in 1992,
media coverage of the campaigns was very disproportionately
in favour of KANU and president Moi, notwithstanding the
reforms regarding this point by the IPPG. Moreover, Opposition
coverage by the two national television channels (KBC and
KTN) was negative throughout and positive as far as KANU
was concerned. Despite the reporting by the written media of
the very chaotic character of the voting day, it was established
that almost 90 per cent of the 7,500 polling stations on which
information was available were well organized. Nevertheless,
the DDDG report mentions some serious problems. First, there
were cases of misprints and omissions of candidates' names on
the ballot papers. Even the Electoral Commission itself had to
admit (in a press release of 31 December 1997) that under such
circumstances 'it cannot be said such elections were fair'.
Second, in 13 per cent of the stations the secrecy of the vote was
not guaranteed. Third, bribery and vote buying were common,
even on election day. Counting of the votes was generally con-
ducted 'in a fair and transparent manner', albeit that there were
substantial delays largely due to ill-prepared returning officers.
In eight constituencies, however, serious irregularities were
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noticed. In threc of these - Westlands (Nairobi), Kitui West
(Eastern) and Changamwe (Mombasa) - the KANU candidate
narrowly won under very suspicious circumstances. This is the
more serious because otherwise the combined Opposition would
have had the majority of the seats in parliament instead of the
ruling party. The counting of the votes for the presidential eleo
tions was 'satisfactory' in most constituencies.
Despite all this, on 7 January 1998 the European Union re-
leased a statement through its president, the British High
Commission in Nairobi, saying that it accepted the results of
not only the presidential but also the parliamentary elections,
describing it as 'a further step in Kenya's development towards
greater democracy'. At the same time it was noted that the
elections feil short of'normal democratie Standards', that there
were incidents of violence, bribery and intimidation of voters.
Moreover, 'voter registration was incomplete, the media, the
TV, and radio controlled by the State did not provide balanced
coverage' (The Daily Nation, 8 Jan. 1998).
CONCLUSION
As in most othcr African countries, ethnic rivalries play an over-
whelming role in Kenyan politics. In such a system, political
parties play a role as vehicles in order to get access to the politi-
cal centre and, hence, to state resources. The easy switching by
candidates for the parliamentary nominations from one party
to another is telling in this respect. With them, the voters
switch as well. FORD-Kenya is a clear Illustration: in 1992 it
was a Luo party with some Luhya support, but with the defec-
tion of the main Luo political leader, it became a pure Luhya
party and lost in 1997 all its support in the province in which it
won overwhelmingly in 1992.
The practice of ethnic voting makes it possible to determine
to a certain extent each party's strong and weak electoral areas.
In a constituency voting system after the British example, com-
bined with control by the ruling party of the Electoral
Commission, this can easily lead to (legal) manipulation and
constituency boundaries which strongly favour KANU. Besides
several other legal and illegal manipulation practices, this was
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a major factor in KANU's large victory in the parliamentary
electionsof 1992.
Does election observation make sense in a system in which
the outcome of the elections is to a certain extent known in
advance? That was a key question after the 1992 elections. It
was feit that because the major manipulation practices took
place during the stages prior to the actual polling day, monitor-
ing of the whole election process was necessary, and in as many
areas as possible. Five years later, this was indeed done by both
a national monitoring group ('Together for Peaceful Elections')
and a group of 22 donor-countries (the Donors' Democratie
Development Group). For the latter group, this was a unique
'experiment' leading to a critical report in which many irregu-
larities were noticed. A careful reader of the report can only
come to the conclusion that the 1997 elections were not really
'free and fair' and that the results of the parliamentary elec-
tion (not the presidential election) are at least questionable.
It is still too early to say what lessons can be drawn from this
'experiment', not only for the group of donor-countries but also
for election observation in general. It is beyond question that
such monitoring is far more useful (but also far more expens-
ive) in assessing the 'free and fair'-ness of such elections than
short-term observation alone. But the main question that
remains is whether the whole election process was positively
influenced because of monitoring activities by the two monitor-
ing groups. What is clear is that despite the monitoring activi-
ties, the election process was not entirely 'free and fair'.
Nevertheless, two tentative conclusions can be drawn from the
DDDG 'experiment'. First, in its role as an objective 'third
party', it is likely that at least it prevented the election process
from being even more 'unfree and unfair'. And second, it served
to legitimize the role of the local monitoring organizations.
NOTES
This section is based on data derived from the Population Censuses of
1969, 1979 and 1989. We are grateful to Deborah IJsendijk and Luuk
Dietz for their assistance with data collection and analysis.
An ethnic cluster consists of one or more 'ethnic groups' as distin-
guished by the Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics during the
148 Electïon Observation and Democratization in Africa
10.
Population Census of 1989. For instance, the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo,
Kalenjin, Kamba, Somali and Turkana are all different ethnic clusters,
wiiile the Kisii, Maasai, Coastal Bantu, Meru and Boran are clusters
consisting of more than one ethnic group.
It is quite easy to define 'home areas' since the Kenyan Districts are de-
marcated along ethnic boundaries. For instance, the Kikuyu home area
constitutes Kiambu, Murang'a, Nyeri, Kirinyaga and Nyandarua
Districts, the Luo home area consists of Kisumu, Siaya and South
Nyanza Districts, whilc the Somali home area is made up of Garissa,
Mandera and Wajir Districts. Only Nairobi and Mombasa are excep-
tions to the rule. It should be noted that the 'original' 40 districts are
used in this analysis: before the many subdivisions that started at the
end of the 1980s.
Kvvale: Coastal Bantu (85 per cent, 84 per cent and 85 per cent in 1969,
1979 and 1989, respectively); Kilifi: Coastal Bantu (94-93-93); Tana
River: Coastal Bantu (64-39-42); Machakos: Kamba (98-97-97);
Embu: Meru cluster (89-86-86); Garissa: Somali (96-83-91); Mandera:
Somali (96-89-98); Wajir: Somali (98-92-98); Murang'a: Kikuyu
(ge-ge-ge); Nandi: Kalenjin (78-71-74); Bungoma: Luhya (84-81-83);
and Busia: Luhya (65-60-61). NB: figures are roundcd.
Mombasa: Coastal Bantu (35-37-40); Kirinyaga: Kikuyu (96-97-97);
Nyandarua: Kikuyu (95-95-96); Laikipia: Kikuyu (57-64-68); Samburu:
Maasai cluster (74-75-75); Kericho: Kalenjin (82-83-83); and Trans
Nzoia: Luhya (47-49-52).
The term 'gerrymandering' is derived from an American governor,
Eldridge Gerry of Massachussets, who concoctcd a constituency that
looked like a salamander. Well-known examples could also be found in
Northern Ireland, where boundaries cut Catholic neighbourhoods in
two, so that in both constituencies the Protestants formed a majority.
The information concerning the Dutch observation team is derived
from Memorandum — 02/93, The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
5 Jan. 1993.
Since this section was written shortly after the elections, only first im-
pressions can be presented here.
The remaining six seats went to FORD-People (3), FORD-Asili (1),
Kenya Social Congress (1) and the Shirikisho Party of Kenya (1). In ad-
dition, twelve members of parliament were nominated: six for KANU,
two for the DP and one for NDPK, SDP and Safina. The fact that half of
the nominated members were proposed by the Opposition was one of
the results of the political reforms of September 1997, because in 1992
all twelve were KANU representatives. In all, KANU now occupies 113
seats in parliament and the combined Opposition 109.
Ballot boxes arrived too late, were insufficient and/or improperly
secured. Ballot papers were not present at all, or too few or the wrong
ones or with the wrong symbols or with no namcs, and so on. Polling
stations could not open as no security guards were at hand or no
officials turned up or staff wanted more money. Hence, in a number of
polling stations people could vote the next day as well.
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